CIPP-E Exam Dumps - Certified Information Privacy Professional/Europe (CIPP/E)

This is not a common characteristic of cloud-computing services, as the supplier usually does not assume the vendor’s business risk. In fact, the supplier often limits its liability for data breaches or losses, and the vendor remains responsible for complying with data protection laws and regulations. The other options are common characteristics of cloud-computing services, as they reflect the nature of cloud computing as a flexible, scalable, and cost-effective way of processing data, but also pose challenges for data protection and security. References:

• Free CIPP/E Study Guide, page 17, section 2.3.2
• CIPP/E Certification, page 12, section 2.3.2
• Cipp-e Study guides, Class notes & Summaries, page 23, section 2.3.2

According to the CIPP/E study guide, Article 33 of the GDPR requires data controllers to notify the supervisory authority of a personal data breach without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after becoming aware of it, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons1. Article 34 of the GDPR requires data controllers to communicate the personal data breach to the data subject without undue delay when the breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons2. Both articles specify the minimum information that the data controller must provide to the supervisory authority and the data subject, which includes: the nature of the breach, the categories and approximate number of data subjects and personal data records concerned, the name and contact details of the data protection officer or other contact point, the likely consequences of the breach, and the measures taken or proposed to address the breach and mitigate its possible adverse effects12. However, neither article requires the data controller to disclose the type of security safeguards used to protect the data, as this information is not relevant for the purposes of notification and may even compromise the security of the data further3. References: 1: CIPP/E study guide, page 84; Art. 33 GDPR; Guidelines 01/2021 on Examples regarding Data Breach Notification2: CIPP/E study guide, page 85; [Art. 34 GDPR]; Guidelines 01/2021 on Examples regarding Data Breach Notification3: Personal Data Breach | European Data Protection Supervisor; What is a data breach and what do we have to do … - European Commission.

According to the GDPR, pseudonymization is a technique that replaces or removes information in a data set that identifies an individual. Pseudonymized data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, which is kept separately and subject to technical and organizational measures to ensure non-attribution1. Pseudonymization is not a method of anonymization, which means that the data is irreversibly altered in such a way that a data subject can no longer be identified2. Pseudonymized data is still considered personal data and subject to the GDPR, but it benefits from some relaxations of the rules, such as the possibility of further processing for compatible purposes, the exemption from some data subject rights, and the facilitation of data transfers3.

In this scenario, Market4U is an advertising technology company that collects and processes a large amount of personal data from its contacts, including sensitive data such as birth date and salary. This data can be used to gain insights into the preferences and behavior of its potential customers, as well as to identify trends and opportunities in different industry verticals. However, this data also poses significant risks for Market4U, such as data breaches, non-compliance, reputational damage, and legal liability. Therefore, Market4U needs to apply the principle of data minimization, which means that it should only collect and process the data that is necessary and relevant for its purposes, and delete the data that is no longer needed4.

One of the ways that Market4U can achieve data minimization is by pseudonymizing the personal data that it uses for analysis. By doing so, Market4U can reduce the risks associated with the processing of personal data, while still retaining the utility and value of the data for its purposes. Pseudonymization can also help Market4U to comply with other GDPR principles, such as purpose limitation, storage limitation, and integrity and confidentiality5. Pseudonymization can also enable Market4U to rely on legitimate interests as a legal basis for the processing of personal data for analysis, as long as it conducts a balancing test and respects the rights and interests of the data subjects6.

Therefore, the best way that Sandy can gain the insights that Dan seeks while still minimizing risks for Market4U is to conduct analysis only on pseudonymized personal data. This option would allow Market4U to use the data for its legitimate business purposes, without compromising the privacy and security of the data subjects.

The other options are incorrect because:

• A. Conducting analysis only on anonymized personal data would not be feasible or effective for Market4U, as anonymization is a very difficult and complex process that requires the removal or alteration of any information that can identify an individual, directly or indirectly. Anonymization may also result in the loss of accuracy, quality, and utility of the data, which would undermine the value and purpose of the analysis. Moreover, anonymization is irreversible, which means that Market4U would not be able to restore the original data if needed2.
• C. Deleting all data collected prior to May 2018 after conducting the trend analysis would not be compliant with the GDPR, as it would violate the principle of storage limitation, which requires that personal data should be kept only for as long as necessary for the purposes for which it is processed. Market4U cannot justify the retention of the data for longer than needed, especially if the data is outdated, irrelevant, or excessive. Moreover, deleting the data after the analysis would not eliminate the risks associated with the processing of the data, such as data breaches or unauthorized access4.
• D. Procuring a third party to conduct the analysis and delete the data from Market4U’s systems would not be a good solution for Market4U, as it would involve the transfer of personal data to another data controller or processor, which would require additional safeguards and obligations under the GDPR. Market4U would still be responsible for ensuring the compliance and security of the data, and would have to enter into a data processing agreement with the third party, as well as inform and obtain the consent of the data subjects, if applicable. Furthermore, procuring a third party would entail additional costs and risks for Market4U, such as losing control and visibility over the data, or exposing the data to unauthorized or unlawful processing by the third party7.

References: 1 Article 4(5) of the GDPR2 Anonymisation | ICO23 Pseudonymisation | ICO34 Data minimisation | ICO45 Guidelines 4/2019 on Article 25 Data Protection by Design and by Default | European Data Protection Board56 Legitimate interests | ICO67 Contracts | ICO7.

The GDPR applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not1. This means that the GDPR applies to any controller or processor that has a branch, office, subsidiary, or other stable arrangement in the EU, even if the data processing occurs outside the EU. However, the GDPR also applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union1. This means that the GDPR applies to any controller or processor that targets or tracks EU data subjects, even if they do not have a presence in the EU. In this case, the website operator is not required to comply with the GDPR because it does not have an establishment in the EU (option B), and it does not offer goods or services or monitor the behaviour of EU data subjects. The website operator reports primarily on North American events, does not block connections from outside the U.S., and only accepts payments in U.S. dollars, which indicate that it does not intend to target or track EU data subjects. Therefore, option B is the correct answer. References: Art. 3 GDPR – Territorial scope, Guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR (Article 3), [What does territorial scope mean under the GDPR?]

 Under the GDPR, the processing of personal data of a child on the basis of consent requires the consent of the holder of parental responsibility over the child, unless the child is at least 16 years old or the applicable national law provides for a lower age (not below 13 years). However, there are some situations where the processing of personal data of a child without parental consent may be justified by other lawful grounds, such as the performance of a contract, the compliance with a legal obligation, the protection of vital interests, the performance of a task carried out in the public interest, or the legitimate interests of the controller or a third party. One of these situations is when the processing is necessary for providing preventive or counselling services to the child, especially in the context of information society services. This is recognised by Recital 38 of the GDPR, which states that:

“Children merit specific protection with regard to their personal data, as they may be less aware of the risks, consequences and safeguards concerned and their rights in relation to the processing of personal data. Such specific protection should, in particular, apply to the use of personal data of children for the purposes of marketing or creating personality or user profiles and the collection of personal data with regard to children when using services offered directly to a child. The consent of the holder of parental responsibility should not be necessary in the context of preventive or counselling services offered directly to a child.”

Therefore, the processing of personal data of a child without parental consent may be lawful if it is necessary for providing preventive or counselling services to the child, such as health, education, social or legal services, that are offered directly to the child and that aim to protect the child’s well-being, safety, development or rights. This may include, for example, online counselling platforms, sexual health advice services, anti-bullying or mental health support services, or child protection helplines. In such cases, the controller should ensure that the processing is fair, transparent, proportionate and respectful of the child’s best interests, and that appropriate safeguards are in place to protect the child’s personal data and rights.

The other options are not likely to justify the processing of personal data of a child without parental consent, as they do not meet the criteria of necessity, proportionality or legitimacy. The processing of personal data of a child for market research purposes is not necessary for the performance of a contract, the compliance with a legal obligation, the protection of vital interests, the performance of a task carried out in the public interest, or the legitimate interests of the controller or a third party, and may pose significant risks to the child’s privacy and autonomy. Therefore, such processing requires the consent of the holder of parental responsibility over the child, unless the child is old enough to give their own consent. The provision of materials purely for educational use to a child may not require the processing of personal data of the child at all, or may only require the processing of minimal personal data, such as the child’s name or email address. In such cases, the processing may be based on the consent of the child, if the child is old enough to understand the implications of their consent, or on the legitimate interests of the controller, if the processing is necessary for the provision of the educational materials and does not override the interests or rights of the child. However, the controller should still inform the child and the holder of parental responsibility about the processing and provide them with the opportunity to object or withdraw their consent. The existence of a legitimate business interest does not automatically justify the processing of personal data of a child without parental consent, as the controller must also consider the impact of the processing on the rights and freedoms of the child, and whether the processing is necessary and proportionate for the pursuit of that interest. Moreover, the controller must balance the legitimate business interest against the interests or rights of the child, and ensure that the processing does not cause any harm or disadvantage to the child. If the processing involves the use of personal data of a child for the purposes of marketing or creating personality or user profiles, the controller must obtain the consent of the holder of parental responsibility over the child, unless the child is old enough to give their own consent, as these purposes pose a high risk to the child’s privacy and autonomy. References: GDPR Article 6, GDPR Article 8, GDPR Recital 38, Children and the UK GDPR | ICO, Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679 - European Data Protection Board

According to Article 13 of the GDPR, the controller (in this case, the electricity supplier) has the obligation to provide the data subject (in this case, the customer) with information about the processing of their personal data, including the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data, if any. However, before providing such information, the controller must verify the identity of the data subject, to ensure that the information is not disclosed to unauthorized persons. This verification can be done by other means than the personal data already collected, such as asking for additional information, sending a verification code, or using a secure online portal. The other options (A, B, and C) are not relevant for this verification, as they do not relate to the identity of the data subject, but to the scope, purpose, and history of the processing. References:

• Article 13 of the GDPR
• The right to be informed (transparency) (Article 13 & 14 GDPR)
• Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)

Convention 108+ is the modernised version of Convention 108, which was the first legally binding international instrument on data protection. The main purpose of Convention 108+ is to update and enhance the protection of personal data in light of the technological developments and the new challenges posed by the globalisation of data processing. Convention 108+ also aims to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of data protection principles and rules, as well as to facilitate the free flow of data between the parties to the Convention.

References:

•Convention 108+ : the modernised version of a landmark instrument1

•Convention 108 and Protocols - Data Protection - The Council of Europe2

•Convention 108 - Council of Europe3

According to the EDPB Guidelines 01/2021 on Examples regarding Personal Data Breach Notification, a confidentiality breach occurs when personal data is disclosed or made available to unauthorized persons. This is the case when exfiltration of job application data from a website results in personal information being accessible to unauthorized persons, such as hackers or competitors. This type of breach may pose a high risk to the rights and freedoms of the data subjects, as it may lead to identity theft, fraud, discrimination, or reputational damage. Therefore, the data controller should notify the data subjects without undue delay, unless the data is encrypted or anonymized, or the controller has taken subsequent measures to ensure that the high risk is no longer likely to materialize.

References: EDPB Guidelines 01/2021 on Examples regarding Personal Data Breach Notification, page 151; CIPP/E Textbook, page 136.