DOP-C02 Exam Dumps - AWS Certified DevOps Engineer - Professional

Step 1: Reacting to CloudFormation Stack Events with EventBridgeAWS CloudFormation emits events during the lifecycle of a stack, including the UPDATE_COMPLETE event after a successful stack update. You can use Amazon EventBridge to detect this event and trigger a specific action (such as invoking a Lambda function).

Action: Create an EventBridge rule that listens for the UPDATE_COMPLETE event for the CloudFormation stack.

Why: EventBridge allows you to automatically detect CloudFormation stack lifecycle events and take action based on them.

Step 2: Invoking the Lambda FunctionAfter the EventBridge rule detects the UPDATE_COMPLETE event, it can invoke the pre-configured Lambda function to apply or update the tag on the specific CloudFormation stack instance.

Action: Configure the EventBridge rule to invoke the Lambda function when the UPDATE_COMPLETE event occurs.

Why: This automation ensures that the tag is applied immediately after a successful stack update without any manual intervention.

https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/how-to-test-and-debug-aws-codedeploy-locally-before-you-ship-your-code/#:~:text=You%20can%20test%20application%20code,local%20server%20or%20EC2%20instance.

The correct answer is C.

Option A is incorrect because creating a new SCP that has two statements, one that allows access to the new range of IP addresses for all the S3 buckets and one that denies access to the old range of IP addresses for all the S3 buckets, is not a valid solution. SCPs are not resource-based policies, and they cannot specify the S3 buckets or the IP addresses as resources or conditions. SCPs can only control the actions that can be performed by the principals in the organization, not the access to specific resources. Moreover, setting a permissions boundary for the OrganizationAccountAccessRole role in the two OUs to deny access to the S3 buckets is not sufficient to revoke the permissions of the two OUs, as there might be other roles or users in those OUs that can still access the S3 buckets.

Option B is incorrect because creating a new SCP that has a statement that allows only the new range of IP addresses to access the S3 buckets is not a valid solution, for the same reason as option A. SCPs are not resource-based policies, and they cannot specify the S3 buckets or the IP addresses as resources or conditions. Creating another SCP that denies access to the S3 buckets and attaching it to the two OUs is also not a valid solution, as SCPs cannot specify the S3 buckets as resources either.

Option C is correct because it meets both requirements of changing the range of IP addresses that have permission to access the contents of the S3 buckets and revoking the permissions of two OUs in the company. On all the S3 buckets, configuring resource-based policies that allow only the new range of IP addresses to access the S3 buckets is a valid way to update the IP address ranges, as resource-based policies can specify both resources and conditions. Creating a new SCP that denies access to the S3 buckets and attaching it to the two OUs is also a valid way to revoke the permissions of those OUs, as SCPs can deny actions such as s3:PutObject or s3:GetObject on any resource.

Option D is incorrect because setting a permissions boundary for the OrganizationAccountAccessRole role in the two OUs to deny access to the S3 buckets is not sufficient to revoke the permissions of the two OUs, as there might be other roles or users in those OUs that can still access the S3 buckets. A permissions boundary is a policy that defines the maximum permissions that an IAM entity can have. However, it does not revoke any existing permissions that are granted by other policies.

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/codedeploy/latest/userguide/deployment-groups.html

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The correct answer is B because AWS Config can continuously evaluate the account-level S3 Block Public Access configuration by using a managed rule. When the configuration becomes noncompliant, AWS Config can trigger automatic remediation through an AWS Systems Manager Automation runbook to restore the required settings.

This solution directly satisfies both requirements:

Detect changes to account-level S3 public access settings.

Automatically revert those changes so that all public access is blocked again.

Why the other options are incorrect:

A. Security Hub is primarily for aggregated security findings and controls visibility. It is not the most direct or standard service for continuous configuration evaluation with automatic remediation of this specific setting.

C. An SCP can restrict permissions, but it does not automatically detect and revert changes to S3 Block Public Access settings.

D. Amazon Macie is for discovering and protecting sensitive data, not for continuously enforcing and remediating S3 Block Public Access account settings.

Accessing a secret from AWS Secrets Manager that is encrypted with a customer managed KMS key requires two distinct permission layers to succeed:

Secrets Manager permissions (via IAM) such as secretsmanager:GetSecretValue for the IAM role assumed by the Kubernetes service account.

KMS key usage permissions in the KMS key policy , allowing the same IAM principal to perform kms:Decrypt (and possibly kms:GenerateDataKey ) on the customer managed key.

In this scenario, the service account assumes an IAM role explicitly created to access the secrets. The symptom is an HTTP 403 “Access Denied” when retrieving the secret. If the IAM role has Secrets Manager permissions but the call still fails, the typical root cause is that the KMS key policy does not trust or allow that IAM role , so the decrypt operation fails.

Option B correctly identifies that the KMS key policy must include the Kubernetes service account IAM role as a principal with the appropriate KMS actions.

Option A and C refer to the EKS cluster IAM role, which is not the principal making the call. Option D is unrelated: the role’s ability to “access the EKS cluster” does not affect its ability to call Secrets Manager or KMS. The missing KMS key policy permission is the underlying cause.

Canary deployments gradually shift traffic (10% at first), enabling monitoring before full rollout.

Monitoring TargetResponseTime aligns with detecting increased latency, a key issue reported.

Alarms tied to the deployment group trigger automatic rollback on threshold breach.

UnHealthyHostCount and TargetConnectionErrorCount are less specific to response time issues.

Linear deployment is valid but canary is preferred for quick detection.

EKS supports control plane logging sent directly to CloudWatch Logs.

CloudWatch Container Insights provides metrics and logs collection for nodes and containers automatically with minimal setup.

CloudWatch Logs Insights offers powerful querying and visualization integrated in AWS without managing additional infrastructure.

Options A and C require deploying and managing additional components (Logstash, Event Exporter, S3, Athena).

Option D adds complexity with OpenTelemetry and Redshift, which is more operationally heavy.